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Abstract 
 
As is well known, the most patient household (i.e., the household possessing the lowest rate of 
time preference) will eventually own all capital in an economy if it behaves unilaterally without 
considering the optimality of the other households. This paper shows that choosing to engage in 
unilateral behavior is not always better for the most patient household than choosing multilateral 
behavior because unilateral behavior results in fewer educational opportunities for most people 
and constrains innovation in technologically advanced societies. Therefore, the rate of growth 
on the path when unilateral behavior is taken will be generally lower than that on the path when 
multilateral behavior is taken. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Becker (1980) showed that the most patient household eventually will own all capital in an 
economy. Heterogeneity in the rate of time preference (RTP) therefore results in an extremely 
dire state. A similar result is obtained for the case of heterogeneity in the degree of risk aversion 
(DRA) (Harashima, 2010). However, Harashima (2010) showed that if relatively more 
advantaged households behave multilaterally considering the optimality of less advantaged 
households, a state where all optimality conditions of all heterogeneous households are satisfied 
can be achieved; that is, the situation that Becker (1980) predicted can be averted. Harashima 
called this state “sustainable heterogeneity.” 
 Nevertheless, if relatively more advantaged households behave unilaterally (i.e., they 
do not consider the optimality of less advantaged households), sustainable heterogeneity will 
not be achieved and the economy will fall into the dire state that Becker (1980) predicted. 
Which behavior (multilateral or unilateral) is better for the most advantaged household? 
Harashima (2010) showed that if the political resistance of less advantaged households against 
the unilateral behavior of the most advantaged household is strong enough, the most advantaged 
household can be forced to behave multilaterally. If the resistance is insufficient, however, it 
appears that the most advantaged household will choose to behave unilaterally because a higher 
rate of growth seems to be guaranteed, but is this actually true? 
 In this paper, the choice of the most advantaged household is examined based on a 
non-scale endogenous growth model. I show that choosing the unilateral behavior is not always 
better because choosing unilateral behavior has an important negative side effect. Overall 
innovation activities (generation of new technologies) are severely constrained as a result of the 
unilateral behavior of the most advantaged household. Unilateral behavior severely restricts the 
opportunities of less advantaged households to receive higher education, and education is 
indispensable to generate innovations (Becker, 1964; Weisbroad, 1966; Lynch, 1991). Because 
of this negative side effect, economies’ capacity to generate new technologies will be severely 
constrained, and the rate of growth will be notably lower. As a result, unilateral behavior is not 
always in the best interest of the most advantaged household. Furthermore, at the present time, it 
is highly likely that multilateral behavior is better for the most advantaged households as well as 
all other households. 
 
2  MULTILATERAL AND UNILATERAL PATHS 
 
2.1  The multilateral path (sustainable heterogeneity) 
The model constructed in Harashima (2010) is used to examine the choice of the most 
advantaged household (details of the model are shown in Appendix B). First, suppose that there 
are H ( N ) economies that are identical except for RTP, DRA, and productivity. Each economy 
is interpreted as representing a group of identical households. The population in each economy 
is identical and constant. The economies are fully open to each other, and goods, services, and 
capital are freely transacted among them, but labor is immobilized in each economy. Note 
households also provide laborers whose abilities are one of factors that determine productivity 
of each economy. 
 The model indicates that if and only if 
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for any economy i (= 1, 2, … , H), all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous  
economies are satisfied at steady state, and 
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for any i and j (i ≠ j), where ci,t, ki,t, and yi,t are per capita consumption, capital, and output of 
economy i in period t, respectively; θi, εi, and ωi are RTP, DRA, and productivity of economy i, 
respectively; At is technology in period t; and α, m, v, and are constants. In addition, tjiτ ,, is 
the current account balance of economy i with economy j, where i = 1, 2, … , H, j = 1, 2, … , H, 
and i ≠ j. Equation (1) is identical to equation (B29) in Appendix B. I call the state satisfying 
this condition (Equation [1]) “sustainable heterogeneity” and the path in which sustainable 
heterogeneity is achieved the “multilateral path.” 
 
2.2  Unilateral path 
Sustainable heterogeneity is not naturally achieved—it depends on the behavior of relatively 
more advantaged economies (see Section B3 in Appendix B). If they behave unilaterally without 
considering the optimality of relatively less advantaged economies, sustainable heterogeneity 
will not be achieved. 
 For simplicity, consider a two-economy model (i.e., H = 2), and the two economies are 
identical except for their RTPs (θ1 < θ2). All of the optimality conditions of economy 1 can be 
satisfied only if either 
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(see Section B3.1 in Appendix B). Equations (2) and (3) are identical to equations (B32) and 
(B33) in Appendix B, respectively. On the other hand, economy 2 can achieve optimality only 
when economy 1 chooses the path satisfying equation (2). Equation (2) corresponds to the case 
of sustainable heterogeneity (i.e., the multilateral path). If economy 1 chooses the path of 
equation (3) (i.e., it behaves unilaterally without considering the optimality of economy 2), 
economy 2 cannot achieve optimality. Economy 2 will eventually lose ownership of all capital, 
and the state predicted by Becker (1980) will be realized. I call the path satisfying equation (3) 
the “unilateral path.” The same result is obtained for heterogeneity in DRA (ε1 < ε2) (see Section 
B3.2 in Appendix B), but heterogeneity in productivity can be sustainable for economy 2 even if 
economy 1 behaves unilaterally (see Section B3.3 in Appendix B). 
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2.3  Comparison of growth rates 
The optimal growth rate of economy 1 is 
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Equation (4) is identical to equation (B14) in Appendix B. Therefore, if economy 1 chooses the 
unilateral path (i.e., behaves according to equation [3]), the growth rate of economy 1 is 
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On the other hand, on the multilateral path (i.e., if economy 1 chooses the path that leads to 
sustainable heterogeneity), the growth rate of economy 1 is 
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Equation (6) is identical to equation (B25) in Appendix B. 
 Equations (5) and (6) indicate that, for economy 1, the growth rate on the unilateral 
path is higher than that on the multilateral path because
2
21
1
θθ
θ

 . This result means that 
behaving unilaterally is always better for economy 1 from the point of view of the growth rate. 
If the political resistance of economy 2 can be easily overcome, economy 1 will always choose 
the unilateral path. 
 Note that the same result is obtained in a multi-economy model of heterogeneity with 
multiple elements (see Section B2.6 in Appendix B). The most advantaged economy will still 
always choose the unilateral path if political resistance in less advantaged economies can be 
easily subdued, because equation (1) holds when sustainable heterogeneity is achieved.  
 However, the unilateral path includes a significant negative side effect that is not 
considered in the previous discussion, which is examined in Section 3. 
 
3  A BETTER PATH FOR THE ADVANTAGED 
HOUSEHOLD 
 
3.1  A non-scale endogenous growth model 
Here I use an endogenous growth model that is the base model of that presented in Section 2 to 
examine the negative side effect (details of the model are presented in Appendix A). The 
advantage of using this endogenous growth model is that it is free from both scale effects and 
the influence of population growth.  
 
3.1.1  The model 
Let Yt (≥ 0) be output, Kt (≥ 0) be capital input, Lt (≥ 0) be labor input, At be technology, Ct (≥ 0) 
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where  0ν is a constant, and a unit of capital Kt and 1ν units of technology At are equivalent; 
that is, they are produced using the same quantities of inputs (capital, labor, and technology). 
This means that technologies are produced with capital, labor, and technology in the same way 
as consumer goods and services and capital. For any period, 
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where Mt is the number of firms (which are assumed to be identical) and m (> 0) is a constant. 
In addition, for any period, 
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is always kept, where  1 and  10  ρρ are constants. The parameter ρ describes the effect 
of uncompensated knowledge spillovers, and the parameter indicates the effect of patent 
protection. ρ will naturally decrease to zero as a result of firms’ profit-seeking behavior; thus, it 
is assumed that ρ = 0 (see Section A1.3 in Appendix A). 
 The optimization problem of households is to maximize expected utility 
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where u(•) is a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, and E is the expectation 
operator. Equation (9) is identical to equation (A8) in Appendix A. 
 
3.1.2  The rate of growth 
The rate of growth on the balanced growth path is 
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where ε is DRA, and α is a constant. Suppose for simplicity that the population is sufficiently 
large (i.e.,
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) and constant (i.e., nt = 0), then the rate of growth on the 
balanced growth path is 
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Equation (10) is identical to equation (A14) in Appendix A. 
 
3.2  Unilateral path and production of technology 
3.2.1  Productivity in generating technology on the unilateral path 
If economy 1 chooses the unilateral path, economy 2 loses all capital. Moreover, it not only 
loses all ownership of all capital but also will owe a huge debt to economy 1. In this situation, 
economy 2 may violently resist politically. If this political resistance is easily overcome by 
economy 1, however, economy 2 will face miserable conditions. At the same time, this situation 
will reduce the capacity of economy 2 (i.e., the less advantaged economies) to generate new 
technologies, which will hurt economy 1. 
 Technology is generated by special labor inputs, that is, by well-educated and talented 
researchers. Hitherto, it has been assumed that the supply of these types of well-educated and 
talented researchers is always sufficient. However, if people in an economy are very poor, it will 
be very difficult for their children to receive enough education even if they are sufficiently 
talented. Education represents a type of investment and requires a considerable amount of 
money. If a household has no savings and a high debt level, it is difficult to invest in education. 
Even if the household’s children are very talented, it will be difficult to raise funds to invest in 
their education. As a result, these talented children will have to choose jobs other than those that 
create innovations or new technologies. Of course, there are various outside sources to obtain 
funds for education (e.g., scholarships), but it is likely that poor people have fewer chances to 
obtain a higher education as compared to wealthier people.  
 On the unilateral path, the most talented children from less advantaged economies will 
not be able to attend higher education institutions because most of these economies will be in a 
distressed state. Educational institutions will instead enroll students who are less talented but 
belong to more advantaged (i.e., wealthier) economies. As a result, on the unilateral path, the 
supply of talented researchers will decrease. Because of the decreased supply of innovative 
thinkers, productivity in generating new technologies will also decrease on the unilateral path. 
The accumulation of technology will therefore be slower than that of the multilateral path and 
the growth rate of economy 1 will decrease as a side effect of its unilateral behavior. 
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3.2.2  Productivity in generating technology 
In the model shown in Section 3.1, productivity in generating new technologies is represented 
by the parameter v. As assumed in Section 3.1.1, a unit of capital Kt and 1ν units of technology 
At are equivalent in the sense that they are produced using the same quantities of common 
resources (capital, labor, and technology). Let  0a and  0k be units of the common 
resources that are required to produce a unit of technology At and a unit of capital Kt, 
respectively. In other words, a unit of technology is equivalent to a units of the common 
resources, and a unit of capital is equivalent to k units of the common resources. Thereby, 
akv  because a unit of capital and 1ν units of technology require the same units of the 
common resources.  
 On the unilateral path, the supply of talented researchers is short. Consequently, 
production of a unit of new technology requires more units of common resources than on the 
multilateral path. Suppose that on the unilateral path, a unit of technology requires Unia units of 
common resources and Uniaa  . In other words, with the same units of common resources, 
fewer units of technology are produced on the unilateral path than on the multilateral path. 
Because akv  , then
Uni
Uni
a
a
akv  and thus  
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Equation (11) indicates that, on the unilateral path, a unit of technology is equivalent to
a
a
v Uni  
units of capital. In other words, a unit of capital and
1



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a
a
v Uni units of technology are equivalent. 
Therefore, if economy 1 chooses the unilateral path, v should be replaced with
a
a
v Uni in the 
model in Section 3.1.   
 
3.2.3  The rate of growth on the unilateral path 
On the unilateral path, therefore, the rate of growth is expressed by replacing v with
a
a
v Uni in 
equation (10) such that  
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In comparing equations (10) and (12), the growth rate on the unilateral path is clearly lower as a 
result of the negative side effect because Uniaa  .  
 
3.3  A path that yields a higher rate of growth 
3.3.1  Comparison of growth rates 
The path that is better for the most advantaged economy is likely to be the one that yields the 
higher rate of growth. Let the average RTP of the two economies be θˆ and the RTP of the most 
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advantaged economy be θ
~
; hence, θθ ˆ
~
 . By equations (1), (5), (6), and (12), the growth rate of 
the most advantaged economy on the multilateral path is  
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and that on the unilateral path is 
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On the multilateral path, the rate of growth depends on θˆ , whereas on the unilateral path, it is 
dominated by θ
~
. A unit of technology is equivalent to Unia on the unilateral path, but it is a on 
the multilateral path. Hence, the choice between the multilateral and unilateral paths depends 
not only on the difference between θˆ and θ
~
but also on that between a and
Unia . If the effect of 
the difference between a and
Unia , that is,  
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prevails over the effect of the difference between θˆ and θ
~
, that is, 
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then the growth rate on the multilateral path is higher than that on the unilateral path. That is,  
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Because all economies except the most advantaged economy become very poor eventually on 
the unilateral path, it is likely that the effect of the difference between a and
Unia prevails over 
the effect of the difference between θˆ and θ
~
. Therefore, the unilateral path does not necessarily 
guarantee a higher rate of growth for the most advantaged economy. Even if political resistance 
of less advantaged economies can be easily overcome, choosing the unilateral path is not always 
better for the most advantaged economy from the point of view of the growth rate.   
 
3.3.2  The better path at the present time 
As technology progresses, that is, as accumulated technology At increases, education will 
become more important for researchers who engage in the generation of new technologies 
because researchers need to possess and understand larger amounts of knowledge. In addition, it 
becomes more difficult for untalented people to sufficiently learn everything they need to know 
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about technology as knowledge accumulates. The previously discussed problem in which the 
most talented people are unable to obtain higher education will therefore become more serious 
as knowledge accumulates. An economy in which greater amounts of knowledge about 
technology accumulates will be more severely damaged by a shortage of educated talented 
researchers. In such an economy, the value of Unia will be very large, and as the economy 
develops, Unia will become far larger. Therefore, it will be likely that as an economy becomes 
more highly developed, the effect of the difference between a and Unia will generally prevail 
over the effect of the difference between θˆ and θ
~
.  
 In the modern world, technology has vastly progressed and education is critically 
important to generate new technologies. Hence, it is likely that the effect of the difference 
between a and Unia generally currently prevails over the effect of the difference between θˆ and 
θ
~
. That is, choosing sustainable heterogeneity (i.e., the multilateral path) will be generally 
better for the most advantaged economy as well as all the other economies. 
 
4  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Becker (1980) showed that the most patient household eventually will own all capital in an 
economy. That is, heterogeneity in RTP results in extreme circumstances, but if relatively more 
advantaged households behave multilaterally, sustainable heterogeneity can be achieved. This 
paper showed that the unilateral path is not always a better choice for more advantaged 
households than the multilateral path because innovations (generation of new technologies) 
diminish because of a negative side effect of the unilateral path. Thereby, the rate of growth on 
the unilateral path is not always higher than that on the multilateral path. At the present time, 
because technology has vastly progressed as compared to the pre-modern period and education 
is very important for generating new technologies, the negative side effect of reducing 
educational opportunities for talented individuals on the unilateral path will be significant. 
Therefore, the rate of growth on the multilateral path will be generally higher than that on the 
unilateral path. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
A1  The model 
A1.1  Production of technologies 
Let Yt (≥ 0) be outputs, Kt (≥ 0) be capital input, Lt (≥ 0) be labor input, At be technology, and Ct 
(≥ 0) be consumption in period t. In addition, 
t
t
t
L
Y
y  , 
t
t
t
L
K
k  , and 
t
t
t
L
C
c  . Outputs Yt are 
the sum of consumption Ct, the increase in capital Kt, and the increase in technology At such that 
 
 
tttt AνKCY
   .                          (A1) 
 
Thus, 
 
 
tt
t
t
ttt kn
L
Aν
cyk 

  ,                        (A2) 
 
where  0ν  is a constant, and a unit of Kt and 1ν  of a unit of At are equivalent; that is, they 
are produced using the same quantities of inputs (capital, labor, and technology). This means 
that technologies are produced with capital, labor, and technology in the same way as consumer 
goods and services and capital.  
 Because balanced growth paths are the focal point of this paper, Harrod-neutral 
technical progress is assumed.1 Hence, the production function is  αtt
α
tt LAKY


1
; thus, 
 
  
α
t
α
tt kAy


1
 . 
 
It is assumed for simplicity that the population growth rate (nt) is constant and not negative such 
that nt = n ≥ 0. 
 
A1.2  Substitution between investments in Kt and At 
For any period,  
 
 
  

m 
Mt
Lt
 ,                               (A3) 
 
where Mt is the number of firms (which are assumed to be identical) and m (> 0) is a constant. 
Equation (A3) presents a natural assumption that the population and number of firms are 
proportional to each other. Equation (A3) therefore indicates that any firm consists of the same 
number of employee regardless of Lt. Note that, unlike the arguments in Young (1998), Peretto 
(1998), Aghion and Howitt (1998), and Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998), Mt is not implicitly 
assumed to be proportional to the number of sectors or researchers in the economy (see also 
Jones, 1999). Equation (A3) merely indicates that the average number of employees per firm in 
an economy is independent of the population. Hence, Mt is not essential for the amount of 
production of At. As will be shown by equations (7) and (8), production of At does not depend 
                                                          
1 As is well known, only Harrod-neutral technological progress matches the stylized facts presented by Kaldor 
(1961). As Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) argue, technological progress must take the labor-augmenting form in the 
production function if the models are to display a steady state.  
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on the number of researchers but on investments in technology. In contrast, Mt plays an 
important role in the amount of uncompensated knowledge spillovers.  
 The constant m implicitly indicates that the size of a firm is, on average, unchanged 
even if the population increases. This assumption can be justified by Coase (1937) who argued 
that the size of a firm is limited by the overload of administrative information. In addition, 
Williamson (1967) argued that there can be efficiency losses in larger firms (see also Grossman 
and Hart, 1986 and Moore, 1992). Their arguments equally imply that there is an optimal firm 
size that is determined by factors that are basically independent of population.  
 Next, for any period,  
 
 t
t
ρ
tt
t
νA
Y
MK
Y





1

 ;                         (A4) 
 
thus,  
 
t
t
ρ
ρ
t
t
t
A
y
νm
L
k
y





1

                           (A5) 
 
is always kept, where  1  and  10  ρρ  are constants. The parameter ρ describes the 
effect of uncompensated knowledge spillovers, and the parameter   indicates the effect of 
patent protection. With patents, incomes are distributed not only to capital and labor but also to 
technology. For simplicity, the patent period is assumed to be indefinite, and no capital 
depreciation is assumed.  
 Equations (A4) and (A5) indicate that returns on investing in capital and technology 
for the investing firm are kept equal. The driving force behind the equations is that firms exploit 
all opportunities and select the most profitable investments at all times. Through arbitrage, this 
behavior leads to equal returns on investments in capital and technology. With substitution 
between investments in capital and technology, the model exhibits endogenous balanced growth. 
Because   αt
α
t
α
t
α
tρ
ρ
t
t
t
t
t kAαkA
νm
αL
k
y
A
y
mν








1
11
1

, 
  tρ
ρ
t
t k
ανm
αL
A


 11

 by equations 
(A3) and (A4), which lucidly indicates that 
t
t
k
A
= constant, and the model can therefore show 
balanced endogenous growth. 
endogenous growth. 
 
A1.3  Uncompensated knowledge spillovers 
Equations (A4) and (A5) also indicate that the investing firm cannot obtain all of the returns on 
its investment in technology. That is, although investment in technology increases Yt, the 
investing firm’s returns are only a fraction of the increase in Yt, such that 
 t
t
ρ
t νA
Y
M 

1

, 
because knowledge spills over to other firms without compensation and other firms possess 
complementary technologies.  
 Broadly speaking, there are two types of uncompensated knowledge spillovers: 
intra-sectoral knowledge spillovers (MAR externalities: Marshall, 1890; Arrow, 1962; Romer, 
1986) and inter-sectoral knowledge spillovers (Jacobs externalities: Jacobs, 1969). MAR theory 
assumes that knowledge spillovers between homogenous firms are the most effective and that 
spillovers will primarily emerge within sectors. As a result, uncompensated knowledge 
spillovers will be more active if the number of firms within a sector is larger. On the other hand, 
 11 
Jacobs (1969) argues that knowledge spillovers are most effective among firms that practice 
different activities and that diversification (i.e., a variety of sectors) is more important in 
influencing spillovers. As a result, uncompensated knowledge spillovers will be more active if 
the number of sectors in the economy is larger. If all sectors have the same number of firms, an 
increase in the number of firms in the economy results in more knowledge spillovers in any case, 
as a result of either MAR or Jacobs externalities. 
 As uncompensated knowledge spillovers increase, the investing firm’s returns on 
investment in technology decrease. 
t
t
A
Y


 indicates the total increase in Yt in the economy by an 
increase in At, which consists of increases in both outputs of the firm that invested in the new 
technologies and outputs of other firms that utilize the newly invented technologies, regardless 
of whether the firms obtained the technologies by compensating the originating firm or through 
uncompensated knowledge spillovers. If the number of firms increases and uncompensated 
knowledge spillovers increase, the compensated fraction in 
t
t
A
Y


 that the investing firm can 
obtain becomes smaller, as do its returns on the investment in technology. The parameter ρ 
describes the magnitude of this effect. If ρ = 0, the investing firm’s returns are reduced at the 
same rate as the increase of the number of firms. 10  ρ  indicates that the investing firm’s 
returns diminish as the number of firms increase but not to the same extent as when ρ = 0. 
 Both types of externalities predict that uncompensated knowledge spillovers will 
increase as the number of firms increases, and scale effects have not actually been observed 
(Jones, 1995), which implies that scale effects are almost canceled out by the effects of MAR 
and Jacobs externalities. Thus, the value of ρ is quite likely to be very small. From the point of 
view of a firm’s behavior, a very small ρ appears to be quite natural. Because firms intrinsically 
seek profit opportunities, newly established firms work as hard as existing firms to profit from 
knowledge spillovers. An increase in the number of firms therefore indicates that more firms are 
trying to obtain the investing firm’s technologies.  
 Because of the non-rivalness of technology, all firms can equally benefit from 
uncompensated knowledge spillovers, regardless of the number of firms. Because the size of 
firms is independent of population and thus constant as argued in Section A1.2, each firm’s 
ability to utilize the knowledge that has spilled over from each of the other firms will not be 
reduced by an increase in population. In addition, competition over technologies will increase as 
the number of firms increases, and any firm will completely exploit all opportunities to utilize 
uncompensated knowledge spillovers as competition increases.2 Hence, it is quite likely that the 
probability that a firm can utilize a unit of new technologies developed by each of the other 
firms without compensation will be kept constant even if the population and the number of 
firms increase. As a result, uncompensated knowledge spillovers will increase eventually to the 
point that they increase at the same rate as the increase in the number of firms. 
 The investing firm’s fraction of 
t
t
A
Y


 that it can obtain will thereby be reduced at the 
same rate as the increase in the number of firms, which means that ρ will naturally decrease to 
zero as a result of firms’ profit-seeking behavior. Based on ρ = 0, 
 
 t
t
tt
t
νA
Y
MK
Y




 
                            (A6) 
                                                          
2 Moreover, a larger number of firms indicates that firms are more specialized. More specialized and formerly 
neglected technologies may become valuable to the larger number of specialized firms. Hence, knowledge spillovers 
will increase. 
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by equations (A4) and (A5); thus,  
 
t
t
t
t
A
y
mνk
y




 
                             (A7) 
 
is always maintained. 
 Complementary technologies also reduce the fraction of 
t
t
A
Y


 that the investing firm 
can obtain. If a new technology is effective only if it is combined with other technologies, the 
returns on investment in the new technology will belong not only to the investing firm but also 
to the firms that possess the other technologies. For example, an innovation in computer 
software technology generated by a software company increases the sales and profits of 
computer hardware companies. The economy’s productivity increases because of the innovation 
but the increased incomes are attributed not only to the firm that generated the innovation but 
also to the firms that possess complementary technologies. A part of 
t
t
A
Y


 leaks to these firms, 
and the leaked income is a kind of rent revenue that unexpectedly became obtainable because of 
the original firm’s innovation. Most new technologies will have complementary technologies. 
Because of both complementary technologies and uncompensated knowledge spillovers, the 
fraction of 
t
t
A
Y


 that an investing firm can obtain on average will be very small; that is,   
will be far smaller than Mt except when Mt is very small.3 
 
A1.4  The optimization problem 
Because 
  tt
k
αmν
α
A


1

, then   t
α
α
t kα
mν
α
y







 1

 and 







α
α
k
mν
A tt
1
  . Hence, 
  ttt
t
tt
α
α
tt
t
t
ttt kn
α
α
k
mL
ckα
mν
α
kn
L
Aν
cyk 














1
1 

   and  
 
 
 
 
 


















tttt
α
α
t
t
t knckα
mν
α
ααmL
αmL
k 1
1
1 

  .            (A8) 
 
 As a whole, the optimization problem of the representative household is to maximize 
the expected utility 
 
   dtθtcuE t 

exp
0
 
 
                                                          
3 If Mt is very small, the value of   will be far smaller than that for sufficiently large Mt because the number of 
firms that can benefit from an innovation is constrained owing to the very small Mt. The very small number of firms 
indicates that the economy is not sufficiently sophisticated, and thereby the benefit of an innovation cannot be fully 
realized. This constraint can be modeled as   tM1~11~   , where  1~   is a constant. Nevertheless, for 
sufficiently large Mt (i.e., in sufficiently sophisticated economies), the constraint is removed such that 
     

~~11~lim 1
t
t
M
M
. 
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subject to equation (A8) where u(•) is a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function 
and E is the expectation operator. 
 
A2  An asymptotically non-scale balanced growth path 
A2.1  Growth rate and transversality condition 
Let Hamiltonian H be 
 
     
 
 
 


















tttt
α
α
t
t
tt knckα
mν
α
ααmL
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λθtcuH 1
1
1
exp


 , 
 
where
tλ is a costate variable. The optimality conditions for the optimization problem shown in 
the previous section are  
 
  
 
 
 
  ααmL
αmL
λθt
c
cu
t
t
t
t
t





1
1
exp                     (A9) 
  
t
t
k
H
λ


                               (A10) 
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 
 


















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α
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α
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1
1 

              (A11) 
  0lim 

tt
t
kλ  .                            (A12) 
 
 By equation (A10),  
 
 
 
 


















t
α
α
t
t
tt nα
mν
α
ααmL
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λλ 1
1
1 

  .              (A13) 
 
Hence, by equations (A9) and (A13), the growth rate of consumption is 
 
 
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
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,            (A14) 
 
where 
u
uc
ε t


 . Note that usually   01 




 
t
α
α
nα
mν
α
, so this is the case examined in 
this paper. 
  By equation (A11), 
 
 
 

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



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, and by 
equation (A13), 
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. Hence,  
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
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1  . 
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Therefore, if 0
t
t
k
c
 for any period, then 0
t
t
t
t
k
k
λ
λ 
, and transversality condition (A12) is 
satisfied. Conversely, if 0
t
t
k
c
 for any period after a certain period, the transversality 
condition is not satisfied.    
 
A2.2  Balanced growth path 
There is a balanced growth path on which all the optimality conditions are satisfied.  
 
Lemma: If and only if 
t
t
t
t
t
t k
k
c
c 

 limlim , all the conditions (equations [A8]–[A11]) are satisfied. 
Proof: (Step 1) 
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. Therefore, 
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(Step 2) If 
t
t
t
t
t
t c
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k 

 limlim , then 
t
t
k
c
 diminishes as time passes because 
t
t
t c
c

lim = constant by 
(Step 1) while 
t
t
t k
k

lim  increases by (Step 1). Thus, eventually 
t
t
k
c
 diminishes to zero, and as 
shown in Section A2.1, transversality condition (A12) is not satisfied. 
 If 
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
k
k 

 limlim , then 
t
t
k
c
 increases indefinitely as time passes because 
t
t
t c
c

lim = 
constant by (Step 1) while 
t
t
t k
k

lim  diminishes and eventually becomes negative by (Step 1). 
Hence, 
tk decreases and eventually equation (A11) is violated because 0tk . 
 On the other hand, if 
t
t
t
t
t
t k
k
c
c 

 limlim , then 
t
t
t k
c

lim  is constant; thus, 
t
t
t k
k

lim  and 
t
t
t c
c

lim  are identical and constant because 
t
t
t c
c

lim = constant by (Step 1).                 ■ 
 
 Rational households will set an initial consumption that leads to the growth path that 
satisfies all the conditions. The Lemma therefore indicates that, given an initial A0 and k0, 
rational households will set the initial consumption c0 so as to achieve the growth path that 
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satisfies 
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 limlim , while firms will adjust kt so as to achieve 
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.4 With 
this household behavior, the growth rates of technology, per capita output, consumption, and 
capital converge at the same rate.  
 
Proposition: If all of the optimality conditions (equations [A8]–[A11]) are satisfied, 
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k
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α
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

1

, then  
t
t
t
t
t
t
A
A
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k
k
α
y
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t
t
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A
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k
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 1  and 
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t A
A
A
A
k
k 

 limlimlim = constant. Hence, by the Lemma, 
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t k
k
c
c
A
A
y
y 

 limlimlimlim  if all the optimality conditions are satisfied.            ■ 
By Proposition and Lemma, the balanced growth path is  
 
  

t
t
t y
y
lim 

t
t
t A
A
lim 

t
t
t c
c
lim 

t
t
t k
k
lim  













  θnα
mν
α
ε
α
α
11

 . 
 
This balanced growth path can be seen as a natural extension of the steady state in the 
conventional Ramsey growth model with exogenous technology.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 Arbitrage conditions (A4) and (A5) indicate that until 
  tt
k
αmν
α
A


1
  is achieved, no investment is made in 
technology if 
  00 1
k
αmν
α
A


  and in capital if 
  00 1
k
αmν
α
A


 .  
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APPENDIX B 
 
B1  The model 
B1.1  The base model 
The model shown in Appendix A is used as the base model. 
 
B1.2  Models with heterogeneous households 
Three heterogeneities―heterogeneous time preference, risk aversion, and productivity―are 
examined in endogenous growth models, which are modified versions of the model shown in 
Appendix A. First, suppose that there are two economies― economy 1 and economy 2—that 
are identical except for time preference, risk aversion, or productivity. The population growth 
rate is zero (i.e., 0tn ). The economies are fully open to each other, and goods, services, and 
capital are freely transacted between them, but labor is immobilized in each economy. 
 Each economy can be interpreted as representing either a country (the international 
interpretation) or a group of identical households in a country (the national interpretation). 
Because the economies are fully open, they are integrated through trade and form a combined 
economy. The combined economy is the world economy in the international interpretation and 
the national economy in the national interpretation. In the following discussion, a model based 
on the international interpretation is called an international model and that based on the national 
interpretation is called a national model. Usually, the concept of the balance of payments is used 
only for the international transactions. However, because both national and international 
interpretations are possible, this concept and terminology are also used for the national models 
in this paper. 
 
B1.2.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
First, a model in which the two economies are identical except for time preference is 
constructed. The rate of time preference of the representative household in economy 1 is 
1θ  
and that in economy 2 is 
2θ , and 21 θθ  . The production function in economy 1 is 
 t
α
tt kfAy ,1,1   and that in economy 2 is  t
α
tt kfAy ,2,2  , where yi,t and ki,t are, respectively, 
output and capital per capita in economy i in period t for i = 1, 2. The population of each 
economy is 
2
tL ; thus, the total for both is Lt, which is sufficiently large. Firms operate in both 
economies, and the number of firms is Mt. The current account balance in economy 1 is tτ  and 
that in economy 2 is 
tτ . Because a balanced growth path requires Harrod neutral 
technological progress, the production functions are further specified as  
 
  α
ti,
α
ti,t kAy
 1  ; 
 
thus,    2,11,,   iLAKY
α
tt
α
titi
. 
 Because both economies are fully open, returns on investments in each economy are 
kept equal through arbitration such that  
 



,t
,t
k
y
1
1  
,t
,t
t
,t,t
k
y
A
yy
mν 2
221
2 




 
.                   (B1) 
 
Equation (B1) indicates that an increase in At enhances outputs in both economies such that 
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
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 21 , and because the population is equal (
2
tL ), 





i,t
i,t
i,t
i,t
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Y
 
 
 
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 
 
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,t,tt
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t A
yy
mv
L
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mLνA
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M 






 212121
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
. Therefore, 
 
  
    
 
    
 t
tt
t
tt
t
kfmν
kfkfα
kfmν
kfkfα
A
,2
,2,1
,1
,2,1
22 






 . 
 
Because equation (B1) is always held through arbitration, equations 
tt kk ,2,1  , tt kk ,2,1
  , 
tt yy ,2,1   and tt yy ,2,1    are also held. Hence, 
 
  
 
 
 
 t
t
t
t
t
kfmν
kαf
kfmν
kαf
A
,2
,2
,1
,1





 . 
 
In addition, because 
   
t
,t,t
t
,t,t
A
yy
A
yy
,2
21
,1
21





 through arbitration, then tt AA ,2,1
   is 
held. 
 The accumulated current account balance dsτ
t
s0  mirrors capital flows between the 
two economies. The economy with current account surpluses invests them in the other economy. 
Since 













t
t
t
t
k
y
k
y
,2
,2
,1
,1  are returns on investments, dsτ
k
y t
s
t
t


0
,1
,1  and dsτ
k
y t
s
t
t


0
,2
,2  represent 
income receipts or payments on the assets that an economy owns in the other economy. Hence,  
 
dsτ
k
y
τ
t
s
t
t
t 


0
,2
,2  
 
is the balance on goods and services of economy 1, and  
 
t
t
s
t
t τdsτ
k
y



0
,1
,1  
 
is that of economy 2. Because the current account balance mirrors capital flows between the 
economies, the balance is a function of capital in both economies such that  
 
   ,t,tt ,kkgτ 21  . 
 
 The representative household in economy 1 maximizes its expected utility 
 
     dttθcuE t 1
0
,11 exp 

 , 
 
subject to 
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and the representative household in economy 2 maximizes its expected utility 
 
     dttθcuE t 2
0
,22 exp 

 , 
 
subject to 
 
1
,2,2
0
,1
,1
,2,2
2

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
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



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ttt
t
s
t
t
tt
L
Aνcτdsτ
k
y
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where ui,t, ci,t, and tiA ,
 , respectively, are the utility function, per capita consumption, and the 
increase in At by R&D activities in economy i in period t for i = 1, 2; E is the expectation 
operator; and 
ttt AAA ,2,1
  . Equations (B2) and (B3) implicitly assume that each economy 
does not have foreign assets or debt in period t = 0. 
 Because the production function is Harrod neutral and because 
 
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Because 
tL  is sufficiently large and   is far smaller than Mt, the problem of scale effects 
vanishes and thereby 
 
 
1
1
1



ααmL
αmL
t
t

.  
 Putting the above elements together, the optimization problem of economy 1 can be 
rewritten as  
 
     dttθcuEMax ,t 1
0
11 exp 

 , 
 
subject to 
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Similarly, that of economy 2 can be rewritten as 
 
     dttθcuEMax ,t 2
0
22 exp 

 , 
 
subject to 
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
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B1.2.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
The basic structure of the model with heterogeneous risk aversion is the same as that of 
heterogeneous time preference. The two economies are identical except in regard to risk 
aversion. The degree of relative risk aversion of economy 1 is 
'u
"uc
ε
,t
1
11
1   and that of 
economy 2 is 
'u
"uc
ε
,t
2
22
2  , which are constant, and 21 εε  . The optimization problem of 
economy 1 is 
 
     dtθtcuEMax ,t 

exp
0
11
 , 
 
subject to 
 
      ,tt
t
s
α
α
,t
α
α
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α
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mν
α
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0
1
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







 
   , 
 
and that of economy 2 is 
 
     dtθtcuEMax ,t 

exp
0
22
 , 
 
subject to 
 20 
 
      ,tt
t
s
α
α
,t
α
α
,t cτdsτα
mν
α
kα
mν
α
k 2
0
1
22 11 











 
   . 
 
B1.2.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
With heterogeneous productivity, the production function is heterogeneous, not the utility 
function. Because technology At is common to both economies, a heterogeneous production 
function requires heterogeneity in elements other than technology. Prescott (1998) argues that 
unknown factors other than technology have made total factor productivity (TFP) heterogeneous 
across countries. Harashima (2009) argues that average workers’ innovative activities are an 
essential element of productivity and make TFP heterogeneous across workers, firms, and 
economies. Since average workers are human and capable of creative intellectual activities, they 
can create innovations even if their innovations are minor. It is rational for firms to exploit all 
the opportunities that these ordinary workers’ innovative activities offer. Furthermore, 
innovations created by ordinary workers are indispensable for efficient production. A 
production function incorporating average workers’ innovations has been shown to have a 
Cobb-Douglas functional form with a labor share of about 70% (Harashima 2009), such that 
 
α
t
α
t
α
tLAt LKAωωσY
 1  ,                        (B4) 
 
where ωA and ωL are positive constant parameters with regard to average workers’ creative 
activities, and σ  is a parameter that represents a worker’s accessibility limit to capital with 
regard to location. The parameters ωA and ωL are independent of At but are dependent on the 
creative activities of average workers. Thereby, unlike with technology At, these parameters can 
be heterogeneous across workers, firms, and economies. 
 In this model of heterogeneous productivity, it is assumed that workers whose 
households belong to different economies have different values of ωA and ωL. In addition, only 
productivity that is represented by α
tLA Aωωσ  in equation (B4) is heterogeneous between the 
two economies. The production function of economy 1 is  ,t
α
t
α
,t kfAωy 111   and that of 
economy 2 is  ,t
α
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Because equation (B1) is always held through arbitration, equations 
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 Because Lt is sufficiently large and   is far smaller than Mt and thus 
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and similarly, that of economy 2 is 
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B2  Sustainability of heterogeneity 
Heterogeneity is defined as being sustainable if all the optimality conditions of all 
heterogeneous households are satisfied indefinitely. Although the previously discussed state of 
Becker (1980) is Pareto efficient, by this definition, the heterogeneity is not sustainable because 
only the most patient household can achieve optimality. Sustainability is therefore the stricter 
criterion for welfare than Pareto efficiency. 
 In this section, the growth path that makes heterogeneity sustainable is examined. First, 
the basic natures of the models presented in Section B1 are examined and then sustainability is 
examined. 
 
B2.1  The consumption growth rate 
B2.1.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
Let Hamiltonian H1 be 
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where 
tλ1  is a costate variable. The optimality conditions for economy 1 are 
 
 
  ,t
,t
,t λtθ
c
cu
11
1
11 exp 


 ,                      (B6) 
,t
,t
k
H
λ
1
1
1


  ,                            (B7) 
    ,tt
t
s
α
α
,t
α
α
,t cτdsτα
mν
α
kα
mν
α
k 1
0
1
11 11 











 
   , and      (B8) 
0lim 11 

,t,t
t
kλ  .                          (B9) 
 
Similarly, let Hamiltonian H2 be 
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where 
tλ 2  is a costate variable. The optimality conditions for economy 2 are 
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By equations (B6), (B7), and (B8), the consumption growth rate in economy 1 is 
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and by equations (B10), (B11), and (B12), that in economy 2 is 
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is satisfied.  
 
B2.1.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
By using similar procedures as were used with the heterogeneous time preference model, the 
consumption growth rate in economy 1 in this model is 
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and that in economy 2 is 
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A constant growth rate such that 
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is satisfied.  
 
B2.1.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
By similar procedures, the consumption growth rate in economy 1 in this model is 
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and that in economy 2 is 
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A constant growth rate such that 
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is satisfied.  
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B2.2  Transversality conditions 
B2.2.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
Transversality conditions are satisfied if the following conditions are satisfied. 
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Proof: See Harashima (2010). 
 
B2.2.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
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B2.2.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
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Lemma 1-3: In the model of heterogeneous productivity, unless 1lim
,1
,1


t
t
t λ
λ
, 1lim
,2
,2


t
t
t λ
λ
, 
1lim
,1
,1


t
t
t k
k
, or 1lim
,2
,2


t
t
t k
k
, the transversality conditions are satisfied if 
 
 
  01
2
lim
1
1
111
0
1
0121 




































  

,t
,t
,t
t
,t
t
,t
t
s
,t
t
s
α
α
t k
c
k
τ
k
τ
k
dsτ
k
dsτ
α
mν
αωω   
 
and  
 
 
  01
2
lim
2
2
222
0
2
0121 




































 



,t
,t
,t
t
,t
t
,t
t
s
,t
t
s
α
α
t k
c
k
τ
k
τ
k
dsτ
k
dsτ
α
mν
αωω   . 
 
 In all three models, the occurrence of 1lim
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B2.3  Sustainability 
Because balanced growth is the focal point for the growth path analysis, the following analyses 
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t
t
t c
c
,1
,1
lim


, 
t
t
t c
c
,2
,2
lim


, 
t
t
t k
k
,1
,1lim


, 
t
t
t k
k
,2
,2lim


, and 
t
t
t 


lim  are 
constants. 
 
B2.3.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
The balanced growth path in the heterogeneous time preference model has the following 
properties. 
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Proof: See Harashima (2010). 
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Proposition 1-1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, if and only if 
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Hence, by Lemma 1-1, the transversality conditions are satisfied while all the other optimality 
conditions are also satisfied. 
 On the other hand, if 
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Lemma 1-1, for both economies to satisfy the transverality conditions, it is necessary that 
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Proof: See Harashima (2010). 
 
 Note that the limit of the growth rate on this path is 
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by equations (B14) and (B15). 
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Proof: By Lemma 2-1, 
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. Therefore, by 
Corollary 1-1, equation (B26) holds.                                             ■ 
 
Because current account imbalances eventually grow at the same rate as output, consumption, 
and capital on the multilateral path, the ratios of the current account balance to output, 
consumption, and capital do not explode, but they stabilize as shown in the proof of Proposition 
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 On the balanced growth path satisfying Proposition 1-1 and Corollaries 1-1 and 2-1, 
heterogeneity in time preference is sustainable by definition because all the optimality 
conditions of the two economies are indefinitely satisfied. The balanced growth path satisfying 
Proposition 1-1 and Corollaries 1-1 and 2-1 is called the “multilateral balanced growth path” or 
(more briefly) the “multilateral path” in the following discussion. The term “multilateral” is 
used even though there are only two economies, because the two-economy models shown can 
easily be extended to the multi-economy models shown in Section B2.6.  
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is examined in the following discussion. 
 
B2.3.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
On the multilateral path in the heterogeneous risk aversion model, the same Proposition, 
Lemmas, and Corollaries are proved by arguments similar to those shown in Section B2.3.1. 
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Corollary 2-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, if and only if 
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On the balanced growth path satisfying Proposition 1-2 and Corollaries 1-2 and 2-2, 
heterogeneity in risk aversion is also sustainable by definition because all the optimality 
conditions of the two economies are indefinitely satisfied, and this path is the multilateral path. 
 
B2.3.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
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 By Lemma 2-3, if all the optimality conditions of both economies are satisfied, either  
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Proposition 1-3: If and only if 
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On the two balanced growth paths satisfying Proposition 1-3 and Corollaries 1-3 and 2-3, 
heterogeneity in productivity is sustainable by definition because all the optimality conditions of 
the two economies are indefinitely satisfied. 
 By equations (B20) and (B21), the limit of the growth rate on these sustainable paths 
is 
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B2.5  A model with heterogeneities in multiple elements 
The three heterogeneities are not exclusive. It is particularly likely that heterogeneities in time 
preference and productivity coexist. Many empirical studies conclude that the rate of time 
preference is negatively correlated with income (e.g., Lawrance, 1991; Samwick, 1998; Ventura, 
2003); this indicates that the economy with the higher productivity has a lower rate of time 
preference and vice versa. In this section, the models are extended to include heterogeneity in 
multiple elements. 
 Suppose that economies 1 and 2 are identical except for time preference, risk aversion, 
and productivity. The Hamiltonian for economy 1 is 
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and that for economy 2 is 
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The growth rates are 
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and the limit of the growth rate on the multilateral path is 
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 as shown in Sections 
B2.3 and B2.4. 
 The sign of Ξ on the multilateral path depends on the relative values between θ1 and θ2, 
ε1 and ε2, and ω1 and ω2. Nevertheless, if the rate of time preference and productivity are 
negatively correlated, as argued above (i.e., if 
21 θθ   and 21 ωω   while 21 εε  ), then by 
similar proofs as those presented for Proposition 2-1 and Corollary 3-1, if 
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on the multilateral path; that is, the current account deficits and trade surpluses of economy 1 
continue indefinitely. The condition 
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satisfied for reasonable parameter values.  
 
B2.6  Multi-economy models 
The two-economy models can be extended to include numerous economies that have differing 
degrees of heterogeneity.  
 
B2.6.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
Suppose that there are H economies that are identical except for time preference. Let θi be the 
rate of time preference of economy i and tjiτ ,,  be the current account balance of economy i 
with economy j, where i = 1, 2, … , H, j = 1, 2, … , H, and i ≠ j. Because the total population is 
Lt, the population in each economy is 
H
Lt . The representative household of economy i 
maximizes its expected utility  
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subject to 
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for i ≠ j. 
 
Proposition 3-1: In the multi-economy model of heterogeneous time preference, if and only if  
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for any i, all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous economies are satisfied at steady 
state, and  
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for any i and j (i ≠ j).  
Proof: See Harashima (2010). 
 
B2.6.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
The heterogeneous risk aversion model can be extended to the multi-economy model by a proof 
similar to that for Proposition 3-1. Suppose that H economies are identical except for risk 
aversion, and their degrees of risk aversion are εi (i = 1, 2, … , H). 
 
Proposition 3-2: In the multi-economy model of heterogeneous risk aversion, if and only if  
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for any i, all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous economies are satisfied at steady 
state, and 
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for any i and j (i ≠ j).  
 
B2.6.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
The heterogeneous productivity model can also be extended by a proof similar to that for 
Proposition 3-1. Suppose that H economies are identical except for productivity, and their 
productivities are ωi (i = 1, 2, … , H). Note that, because  tk ,21  
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Proposition 3-3: In the multi-economy model of heterogeneous productivity, if and only if 
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for any i, all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous economies are satisfied at steady 
state, and 
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for any i and j (i ≠ j).  
 
B2.6.4  Heterogeneity in multiple elements 
Similarly, the multi-economy model can be extended to heterogeneity in multiple elements, as 
follows. 
 
Proposition 3-4: In the multi-economy model of heterogeneity in multiple elements, if and only 
if  
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for any i (= 1, 2, … , H), all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous economies are 
satisfied at steady state, and 
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for any i and j (i ≠ j).  
 
 Proposition 3-4 implies that the concept of the representative household in a 
heterogeneous population implicitly assumes that all households are on the multilateral path. 
 
B2.7  Degeneration to an exogenous technology model 
The multilateral paths in the endogenous growth models imply that similar sustainable states 
exist in exogenous technology models. However, this is true only for the heterogeneous time 
preference model, because, in exogenous technology models, the steady state means that 
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; that is, the heterogeneity in risk aversion is irrelevant to the steady state, and the 
heterogeneous productivities do not result in permanent trade imbalances due to 
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. Thereby, only heterogeneous time preference is relevant to sustainable 
heterogeneity in exogenous growth models. 
 If technology is exogenously given and constant (At = A), Hamiltonians for the 
heterogeneous time preference model shown in Section B1.2.1 degenerate to  
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By equations (B6), (B7), and (B8), the growth rate of consumption in economy 1 is 
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If equation (B31) holds, all the optimality conditions of both economies are indefinitely satisfied. 
This result is analogous to equation (B25) and corresponds to the multilateral path in the 
endogenous growth models. The state indicated by equation (B31) is called the “multilateral 
steady state” in the following discussion. 
 If both economies are not open and are isolated, 
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multilateral steady state with 
21 θθ  , the amount of capital in economy 1 is smaller than when 
the economy is isolated and vice versa. As a result, output and consumption in economy 1 are 
also smaller in the multilateral steady state with 
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that is, economy 1 possesses accumulated debts owed to economy 2 at steady state, and 
economy 1 has to export goods and services to economy 2 by 
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in every period to pay the debts. Nevertheless, because 0lim 

t
t
τ  and 0Ξ , the debts do 
not explode but stabilize at steady state. 
 In the multilateral steady state, all the optimality conditions of both economies are 
satisfied, and heterogeneity is therefore sustainable. However, this state will be economically 
less preferable for economy 1 as compared with the state of Becker (1980), because 
consumption is smaller and debts are owed. Which state should economy 1 select? A similar 
dilemma―whether to give priority to simultaneous optimality with economy 2 or to unilaterally 
optimal higher utility―will also arise in the endogenous growth models; this is examined in the 
following sections. 
 
B3  Unilateral balanced growth 
The multilateral path satisfies all the optimality conditions, but that does not mean that the two 
economies naturally select the multilateral path. Ghiglino (2002) predicts that it is likely that, 
under appropriate assumptions, the results of Becker (1980) still hold in endogenous growth 
models. Farmer and Lahiri (2005) show that balanced growth equilibria do not exist in a 
multi-agent economy in general, except in the special case that all agents have the same constant 
rate of time preference. How the economies behave in the environments described in Sections 
B1 and B2 is examined in this section. 
 
B3.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
The multilateral path is not the only path on which all the optimality conditions of economy 1 
are satisfied. Even if economy 1 behaves unilaterally, it can achieve optimality, but economy 2 
cannot. 
 
Lemma 4-1: In the heterogeneous time preference model, if each economy sets 
tτ  without 
regarding the other economy’s optimality conditions, then it is not possible to satisfy all the 
optimality conditions of both economies. 
Proof: See Harashima (2010). 
 
 Since    
































1
,1
1
,1
11
1
1 limlimlim11lim θ
k
τ
τ
τ
k
τ
α
mν
α
α
mν
α
ε
c
c
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
α
α
α
α
,t
,t
t
 
 
at steady state, all the optimality conditions of economy 1 can be satisfied only if either 
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That is, 
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 can be constant only when either equation (B32) or (B33) is satisfied. 
Conversely, economy 1 has two paths on which all its optimality conditions are satisfied. 
Equation (B32) indicates that 
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economy 2 must initially set consumption such that 02,c , which violates the optimality 
condition of economy 2. Therefore, unlike with the multilateral path, all the optimality 
conditions of economy 2 cannot be satisfied on the path satisfying equation (B33) even though 
those of economy 1 can. Hence, economy 2 has only one path on which all its optimality 
conditions can be satisfied—the multilateral path. The path satisfying equation (B33) is called 
the “unilateral balanced growth path” or the “unilateral path” in the following discussion. 
Clearly, heterogeneity in time preference is not sustainable on the unilateral path. 
 How should economy 2 respond to the unilateral behavior of economy 1? Possibly, 
both economies negotiate for the trade between them, and some agreements may be reached. If 
no agreement is reached, however, and economy 1 never regards economy 2’s optimality 
conditions, economy 2 generally will fall into the following unfavorable situation. 
 
Remark 1-1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, if economy 1 does not regard the 
optimality conditions of economy 2, the ratio of economy 2’s debts (owed to economy 1) to its 
consumption explodes to infinity while all the optimality conditions of economy 1 are satisfied. 
 
The reasoning behind Remark 1-1 is as follows. When economy 1 selects the unilateral path and 
sets c1,0 so as to achieve this path, there are two options for economy 2. The first option is for 
economy 2 to also pursue its own optimality without regarding economy 1: that is, to select its 
own unilateral path. The second option is to adapt to the behavior of economy 1 as a follower. If 
economy 2 takes the first option, it sets c2,0 without regarding c1,0. As the proof of Lemma 4-1 
indicates, unilaterally optimal growth rates are different between the two economies and 
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capital soon becomes abundant in economy 2, and excess goods and services are produced in 
that economy. These excess products are exported to and utilized in economy 1. This process 
escalates as time passes because 
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almost all consumer goods and services produced in economy 2 are consumed by households in 
economy 1. These consequences will be unfavorable for economy 2. 
 If economy 2 takes the second option, it should set 02,c  to satisfy all its 
optimality conditions, as the proof of Lemma 4-1 indicates. Setting 02,c  is impossible, but 
economy 2 as the follower will initially set 
,tc2  as large as possible. This action gives economy 
2 a higher expected utility than that of the first option, because consumption in economy 2 in the 
second case is always higher. As a result, economy 2 imports as many goods and services as 
possible from economy 1, and the trade deficit of economy 2 continues until 
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 is achieved. The current 
account deficits and the accumulated debts of economy 2 will continue to increase indefinitely. 
Furthermore, they will increase more rapidly than the growth rate of outputs (
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because, in general, 
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disturbance occurs, the expansion of debts may be sustained forever, but economy 2 becomes 
extremely vulnerable to even a very tiny negative disturbance. If such a disturbance occurs, 
economy 2 will lose all its capital and will no longer be able to repay its debts. This result 
corresponds to the state shown by Becker (1980), and it will also be unfavorable for economy 2. 
Because   01lim
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, inequality (B23) holds, and the transversality 
condition for economy 1 is satisfied by Lemma 1-1. Thus, all the optimality conditions of 
economy 1 are satisfied if economy 2 takes the second option. 
 As a result, all the optimality conditions of economy 2 cannot be satisfied in any case 
if economy 1 takes the unilateral path. Both options to counter the unilateral behavior of 
economy 1 are unfavorable for economy 2. However, the expected utility of economy 2 is 
higher if it takes the second option rather than the first, and economy 2 will choose the second 
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option. Hence, if economy 1 does not regard economy 2’s optimality conditions, the debts owed 
by economy 2 to economy 1 increase indefinitely at a higher rate than consumption. 
 
B3.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
The same consequences are observed in this model. 
 
Lemma 4-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, if each economy sets 
tτ  without 
regard for the other economy’s optimality conditions, then all the optimality conditions of both 
economies cannot be satisfied. 
 
Therefore, heterogeneity in risk aversion is not sustainable on the unilateral path. 
 
Remark 1-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, if economy 1 does not regard 
economy 2’s optimality conditions, the ratio of economy 2’s debts (owed to economy 1) to its 
consumption explodes to infinity while all the optimality conditions of economy 1 are satisfied. 
 
B3.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
Unlike the heterogeneous preferences shown in Sections B3.1 and B3.2, heterogeneity in 
productivity can be sustainable even on the unilateral path. 
 
Lemma 4-3: In the heterogeneous productivity model, even if each economy sets 
tτ  without 
regard for the other economy’s optimality conditions, it is possible that all the optimality 
conditions of both economies are satisfied if 
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Proof: See Harashima (2010). 
 
 All the optimality conditions of economy 1 can be satisfied only if either equation 
(B27) or (B28) holds, because 
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,1lim
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 can be constant only when equation (B27) or (B28) 
holds. Equation (B27) corresponds to the multilateral path, and equation (B28) corresponds to 
the unilateral path. Unlike the heterogeneity in preferences, Lemma 4-3 shows that, even on the 
unilateral path, all the optimality conditions of both economies are satisfied because the limit of 
both economies’ growth rates is identical on the path of either equation (B27) or (B28), such 
that 
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,1  . Therefore, heterogeneity in productivity is 
sustainable even on the unilateral path. 
 Nevertheless, on the unilateral path, current account imbalances generally grow 
steadily at a higher rate than consumption; this is not the case on the multilateral path. How does 
economy 1 set τ? If economy 1 imports as many goods and services as possible before reaching 
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the steady state at which 
 
  α
α
t
s
t
s
t
t
t
t
α
mν
αωω
ds
dt
dsd





 









121
0
0
1
2
limlim




  (i.e., if it 
initially sets τi as 0tτ  and 0
0
,2
,2 


  dsτk
y
τ
t
s
t
t
t
), the expected utility of economy 1 will be 
higher than it is in either case where 0tτ  or in the multilateral path. However, the debts 
economy 1 owes to economy 2 will grow indefinitely at a higher rate than consumption, and the 
ratio of debt to consumption explodes to infinity. If there is no disturbance, this situation will be 
sustained forever, but economy 1 will become extremely vulnerable to even a very tiny negative 
disturbance. Hence, the unilateral path will not necessarily be favorable for economy 1 although 
all its optimality conditions are satisfied on this path, and economy 1 will prefer the multilateral 
path. 
 
Remark 1-3: In the heterogeneous productivity model, even though economy 1 does not regard 
economy 2’s optimality conditions, the multilateral balanced growth path will be selected. 
 
Hence, the state shown by Becker (1980) will not be observed in the case of heterogeneous 
productivity.  
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